Ransomware Data Recovery
Hardware-Level Recovery & Offline Extraction
We do not negotiate with criminals. We help you recover data without paying the ransom. Attackers often fail to encrypt everything, or they damage backups which we can then recover. We can image your drives offline, ensuring no malware spreads, and hunt for unencrypted shadow copies (HDDs), deleted fragments, and backup archives.
Secure Offline Recovery
Ransomware Recovery in One Paragraph
We image affected drives offline through hardware write-blockers, extract Volume Shadow Copies and unencrypted remnants, and repair backup hardware the attackers damaged. No decryption key is required for the data we recover. Every step is documented with SHA-256 hashes and timestamped logs so your cyber insurance carrier receives forensic-grade evidence. Pricing starts at $100 (HDD) and $200 (SSD). No data, no fee.
What Can Data Recovery Services Recover After a Ransomware Attack?
Ransomware attackers often fail to encrypt everything. We recover deleted shadow copies, unencrypted fragments, formatted backup drives, and damaged RAID arrays without a decryption key. AES-256 encryption cannot be reversed without a key; the data we target exists outside the encrypted portion of your storage.
We CAN Recover:
- Deleted shadow copies (VSS)
- Formatted backup drives
- Damaged RAID arrays (sabotaged by attackers)
- Files from "interrupted" encryption
- Unencrypted fragments in free space
We CANNOT:
- ✕ Break AES-256 encryption math
- ✕ Decrypt files without a key (unless a decryptor exists)
- ✕ Negotiate payment for you
How Does Ransomware Cause SSD Firmware Failures?
Sustained encryption write loads exhaust an SSD's spare block pool and trigger controller-level firmware panics. The drive locks into safe mode or drops off the bus entirely, requiring hardware intervention via PC-3000 SSD before any data extraction can begin.
- Phison PS3111-S11 Safe-Mode Lock
- Drives using the Phison PS3111 controller (common in Kingston A400, Patriot Burst, and Inland Professional SSDs) enter a read-only safe mode when the controller detects excessive NAND wear or write amplification. The drive reports its model string as "SATAfirm S11" instead of the original product name. A technician manually shorts the controller's ROM test pads to force it into factory ROM mode, then uses PC-3000 SSD to upload the loader (LDR) microcode and rebuild the flash translator in RAM to access the underlying NAND pages.
- Silicon Motion SM2258XT Zero-Capacity Failure
- SSDs with Silicon Motion SM2258XT controllers (used in Crucial BX500, ADATA SU650, and WD Green drives) report 0 bytes capacity after sustained high-IOPS write events. The controller loses its mapping table when the FTL journal overflows. PC-3000 SSD issues vendor-specific diagnostic commands to force the controller past the stalled boot sequence, then reconstructs the logical-to-physical address map using the native silicon for hardware descrambling. This recovers data that was never encrypted because the controller failed before the ransomware finished writing.
Both failure modes require physical board-level access before any decryption or file carving can proceed. Standard SSD data recovery techniques apply to these ransomware-triggered hardware failures.
How Does Ransomware Lock NVMe SSD Controllers?
High-IOPS random write workloads generated by ransomware encryption (LockBit, BlackCat/ALPHV) trigger Flash Translation Layer corruption in NVMe controllers. The drive enters a BSY state or drops off the PCIe bus, requiring physical board-level recovery before any file extraction.
- Marvell 88SS1093 PCIe Timeout
- NVMe drives using the Marvell 88SS1093 controller (found in early WD Black Gen 1 and Plextor M9Pe models) stall when the FTL metadata write-back queue overflows during sustained encryption. The drive stops responding to PCIe NVMe commands and the host logs "device not ready" errors. We use the PC-3000 Portable III PCIe NVMe adapter to access the controller's diagnostic mode and image the drive contents with managed read timeouts before the FTL corruption propagates to the user data area.
- Samsung Elpis Controller Firmware Read-Only Lockup
Samsung 980 PRO drives use the Elpis controller. Under sustained heavy write loads, affected firmware versions (notably 3B2QGXA7) accumulate abnormal media and integrity errors (SMART attribute 0E) and permanently lock the NAND into read-only mode to protect against further corruption. The drive remains visible to the host but refuses writes.
Because Samsung NVMe controllers use hardware-bound AES-256 encryption, data must be read through the original controller; NAND chip removal yields only ciphertext. We image the drive through the locked controller using managed read timeouts to secure a forensic-grade copy of whatever the ransomware had not yet overwritten.
- Phison E16 / E18 Gen4 NVMe FTL Journal Overflow
Sabrent Rocket NVMe 4.0, Seagate FireCuda 530, and Corsair MP600 drives use the Phison PS5016-E16 or PS5018-E18 Gen4 controller. Sustained random-write IOPS from ransomware encryption overwhelms the FTL metadata journal faster than the controller can flush it to NAND. The controller enters a BSY state and disappears from the PCIe bus to protect mapping integrity.
We connect the drive to the PC-3000 Portable III PCIe NVMe adapter, force the controller into safe mode by shorting the technological-mode (TM) pads on the PCB, upload a custom Phison loader (LDR), and rebuild the FTL in adapter RAM to extract whatever the encryption process had not yet overwritten. NAND blocks unmapped via TRIM before the attack remain unrecoverable; only data that survived in mapped LBAs at the moment of FTL panic can be carved.
How Long Does Enterprise Ransomware Recovery Take?
Recovery timelines depend on the physical condition of the storage hardware & the number of drives in the array. The ransomware variant is irrelevant to imaging speed.
- Single-Drive Cases: 1 to 5 Days
- A single hard drive or SSD connected to a hardware write-blocker images at the media's native read speed. A healthy 2 TB HDD images in roughly 8 to 12 hours. Drives with bad sectors or firmware instability require PC-3000's managed read retry logic, which extends imaging to 2 to 5 days depending on damage density.
- Multi-Drive RAID & SAN: 1 to 3 Weeks
- Enterprise RAID arrays require each member disk to be imaged individually before virtual reconstruction begins. A 12-drive RAID 6 with 8 TB members means imaging 96 TB of raw capacity sequentially through write-blockers. After imaging, PC-3000 RAID Edition reconstructs the virtual array from the cloned images, parsing stripe sizes & parity rotation from the controller superblocks.
- Rush Imaging Available
- A +$100 rush fee to move to the front of the queue moves your drives to the front of the imaging queue. For multi-drive enterprise cases, contact us for a custom rush timeline based on your array size & hardware condition.
What Is Our Ransomware Recovery Process?
We isolate infected drives from the network, create forensic-grade clones using hardware write-blockers, then scan raw sectors for recoverable data that the ransomware missed or failed to encrypt.
- Offline imaging via hardware write-blockers. We clone your infected drives using PC-3000 and DeepSpar connected through hardware write-blockers. This prevents the ransomware from spreading or continuing to encrypt, while preserving the evidence state for insurance documentation.
- Raw sector scanning for unencrypted remnants. We scan the raw physical sectors for deleted versions of files, temporary files, and Volume Shadow Copies that the ransomware attempted (but failed) to wipe. On mechanical drives, deleted data persists on the magnetic platters until physically overwritten.
- Backup drive hardware repair. Older backup drives often fail mechanically when you try to restore from them in a panic. We perform hard drive recovery on these critical backup drives, including NAS and RAID arrays, to get your pre-attack data back.
What Should Your IT Team Do in the First 60 Minutes After a Ransomware Attack?
Physically disconnect network cables from all affected machines, leave servers powered on to preserve volatile RAM evidence, and contact a recovery lab that uses hardware write-blockers for imaging. Incorrect triage in the first hour destroys forensic evidence and voids cyber insurance claims.
- Disconnect network cables from all affected servers and workstations. Do not rely on disabling Wi-Fi or software-level network isolation. Pull the Ethernet cables and disable iSCSI initiators to prevent lateral movement across the domain. If the attack entered through RDP or a compromised VPN appliance, disable those access points at the firewall.
- Do not power down affected machines. Active encryption keys and threat actor artifacts reside in volatile RAM. A hard shutdown erases this forensic evidence permanently. If you need to stop encryption from progressing, disconnect the storage (pull SAS/SATA cables) rather than cutting power to the entire server.
- Contact a lab that uses hardware write-blockers for imaging. Software-based forensic copies risk executing the ransomware payload on the imaging workstation. We connect affected drives to hardware write-blockers and create sector-level clones using PC-3000 without ever mounting the file system. For multi-drive server and RAID environments, each member disk is imaged individually before any reconstruction begins.
What Happens After the First 60 Minutes of a Ransomware Attack?
The triage steps above stop the bleeding. The full recovery lifecycle has six phases, each with specific hardware & documentation requirements that affect your cyber insurance claim eligibility.
- Validate the attack. Confirm you're dealing with actual encryption, not adware or a lock-screen scam. Check for ransom notes in affected directories & cross-reference the file extensions against ID Ransomware to identify the variant. If a public decryptor exists, the recovery process changes.
- Assemble the response team. Your IR team includes IT staff, legal counsel, your cyber insurance carrier's breach hotline, & the data recovery lab. Insurance carriers often require notification within 24 to 72 hours of discovery. Delayed notification voids coverage on some policies.
- Contain via hardware isolation. This is the first-60-minutes triage: pull network cables, leave machines powered on, disable RDP & VPN endpoints at the firewall. Every server & workstation that touched the infected network segment gets isolated.
- Image all affected drives using hardware write-blockers. We connect each drive to a write-blocker & create bit-for-bit forensic clones using PC-3000 & DeepSpar. The write-blocker prevents the ransomware payload from executing during imaging. Original drives stay offline & untouched from this point forward.
- Extract recoverable data from forensic images. We scan cloned images for deleted files, Volume Shadow Copies, unencrypted free-space fragments, & backup archives the attacker missed. On mechanical drives, deleted VSS data persists on the magnetic platters until overwritten. On SSDs, TRIM limits what can be recovered.
- Deliver forensic documentation for insurance & law enforcement. We generate SHA-256 hashes, timestamped recovery logs, ransomware variant identification, & an independent audit report. Your insurer receives the full chain-of-custody documentation proving evidence integrity from seizure through recovery.
What Is Backup Poisoning and How Does It Affect Recovery Point Objectives (RPO)?
Backup poisoning is the deliberate corruption of backup repositories during the attacker dwell period before encryption fires. Sophisticated actors sit inside a network for two to eight weeks, modifying backup chains so automated verification jobs pass while actual restores fail. The result: your nominal RPO of 24 hours becomes an effective RPO of weeks or months once you discover that every recent backup is unrecoverable.
- Veeam VBK Header Tampering
- Attackers with domain admin credentials can modify Veeam backup metadata so the backup service reports successful jobs while the underlying VBK chain references encrypted or null blocks. We image the underlying repository drives offline through hardware write-blockers, then validate each backup chain against its catalog by checking block hashes against the metadata before any restoration is attempted.
- Datto and BDR Appliance Tampering
- Datto SIRIS, ALTO, and similar BDR appliances run on ZFS or hardware RAID. Attackers with appliance credentials can delete snapshots or corrupt the ZFS metadata to break the snapshot tree. We extract the underlying disks from the appliance chassis, image each member through write-blockers, and reconstruct the ZFS pool offline to walk the snapshot history for pre-dwell-period recovery points.
- Identifying Pre-Dwell-Period RPOs
Once we have offline images of every backup repository, we compare backup catalog dates against the suspected initial-access date in the threat actor timeline. Any backup created before the dwell period began is presumed clean.
Any backup created during the dwell period requires file-level integrity validation before restoration, because attackers commonly plant persistence mechanisms that survive a backup restore and re-trigger encryption days later. We perform this validation against backup data extracted from Veeam and Datto backup repositories before delivery.
How Do You Identify the Ransomware Family Hitting Your Network?
Cross-reference the file extension, the ransom note filename, and the encryption pattern against ID Ransomware and the No More Ransom Project. Family identification matters because some strains have public decryptors, some have known FTL-panic side effects on specific SSD controllers, and some encrypt selectively in ways that affect which carving strategy works.
- File Extension and Ransom Note Triage
- The new file extension applied to encrypted files (e.g., .lockbit, .ryuk, .akira, .conti, .blackcat) is the fastest identifier. The ransom note filename and contents are the second signal. Photograph the ransom note before any reboot. Do not edit, rename, or delete it; the original timestamps are evidence for your insurance carrier and law enforcement filing.
- Family-Specific Recovery Notes
- Different families behave differently against hardware-level recovery. We document variant-specific procedures on dedicated subpages where the recovery path materially differs from the general workflow: LockBit 3.0 recovery covers offline forensic imaging for LockBit-encrypted RAID arrays, and Ryuk recovery covers the legacy Ryuk variant that targeted Windows file servers and Active Directory hosts.
- When the Family Cannot Be Identified
- Newly emerged or heavily customized variants may not match any public signature. The hardware-level workflow does not depend on family identification; we still image through write-blockers, carve the raw images for unencrypted remnants and shadow copies, and recover whatever survived outside the encrypted byte ranges. Family identification only changes the answer to "is there a public decryptor we can apply to the imaged data."
What Documentation Does Cyber Insurance Require After a Ransomware Attack?
Cyber liability policies require forensic documentation proving evidence integrity. Attempting internal recovery without establishing a forensic baseline gives adjusters grounds to deny business interruption and ransom reimbursement claims.
- Pre-Imaging SHA-256 Hashing
- Before we connect any write-blocker, we generate SHA-256 cryptographic hashes of every affected drive at the raw block device level. These hashes establish a verifiable baseline proving no data was altered between seizure and imaging. The hash values, timestamps, and drive serial numbers go into the forensic log.
- Forensic Audit Trail
- Every recovery action is timestamped and logged: which engineer handled the drive, what tools were used, which sectors were read, and what files were extracted. This chronological documentation satisfies the chain-of-custody requirements that insurance adjusters and legal counsel review before approving payouts.
- Independent Reporting
- We deliver a forensic incident report alongside the recovered data. The report includes hash verification results, a timeline of all recovery procedures, and the ransomware variant identification. Your IT team can submit this directly to your insurer or attach it to a law enforcement filing. Read more about our physical and digital security protocols.
How Do You Recover Data from Ransomware-Encrypted Virtual Machines?
Ransomware targeting VMware ESXi or Hyper-V environments encrypts the virtual disk files (VMDK, VHD, VHDX) rather than individual guest files. Recovery requires bypassing the host layer.
- VMDK/VHDX Sector-Level Mounting
- We image the affected datastore LUNs offline using hardware write-blockers. PC-3000 Data Extractor mounts the virtual disk images at the sector level, bypassing the hypervisor and reading the guest file system directly from the flat file. If the ransomware only encrypted the VMDK descriptor or the first few extents, the remaining guest data is readable.
- Incomplete Encryption Carving
- Most ransomware encrypts in chunks; if the process was interrupted (power loss, detection, reboot), large portions of the virtual disk remain unencrypted. We parse the flat file extent by extent in a hex editor, identify the encrypted vs. unencrypted blocks, and carve recoverable files from the clean regions.
- Backup Repository Repair
- Attackers commonly target Veeam repositories and NAS-based backup shares before encrypting production VMs. We perform standard NAS recovery on these backup devices. Recovering a pre-attack Veeam backup set restores the entire VM state from before the encryption event.
How Do You Extract VMFS Data After ESXi Ransomware?
Ransomware variants like Akira and LockBit target VMware ESXi hypervisors through SSH tunneling or Active Directory integration exploits. We disconnect the storage from the compromised host and extract data directly from the underlying hardware.
- Offline VMFS Datastore Parsing
- ESXi ransomware encrypts .vmdk flat files and .vmx configuration files on the VMFS datastore. We disconnect the SAN or DAS storage from the compromised ESXi host, connect each drive to a hardware write-blocker, and reconstruct the underlying RAID array using PC-3000 RAID Edition. Data Extractor then parses the raw VMFS file system directly, without the hypervisor layer. If the ransomware only encrypted the VMDK descriptor or the first few extents, the remaining guest OS data is readable from the unencrypted flat file regions.
- Targeting Backup Repository Drives
- Attackers commonly delete or encrypt Veeam backup repositories and NAS-based backup shares before encrypting production VMs. When the backup storage uses a separate physical array, we perform standard server data recovery on those backup drives. Recovering a pre-attack Veeam VBK backup set restores the entire VM state from before the encryption event without needing to decrypt anything.
How Do You Recover SQL Server Databases Hit by Ransomware?
Attackers brute-force exposed MSSQL ports and abuse the xp_cmdshell stored procedure to drop payloads that encrypt or destroy .mdf and .ldf database files. Recovery requires raw sector carving from the underlying storage.
- xp_cmdshell Payload Deployment
- Campaigns like DB#JAMMER gain access through weak SA passwords on internet-facing SQL Server instances, enable xp_cmdshell, and use it to stage Cobalt Strike beacons and the FreeWorld (Mimic variant) ransomware binary on the host. The FreeWorld payload then encrypts the database files (.mdf data and .ldf transaction logs) and drops a ransom note.
- Raw MDF Page Carving from Offline Images
- We image the underlying host drives offline using hardware write-blockers and scan the raw sectors for deleted SQL data pages and transaction log fragments. On mechanical drives, the deleted .mdf pages persist on the magnetic platters until physically overwritten. We reassemble the recovered 8 KB SQL data pages into a consistent database structure. If the server used encrypted storage, the raw sector scan operates on the decrypted block device layer after we unlock the volume with the customer's BitLocker or LUKS key.
Does Our No Fix, No Fee Guarantee Apply to Ransomware Cases?
If we cannot recover usable files from your ransomware-affected drives, you pay $0. Our No Fix, No Fee guarantee applies to every ransomware case, with no non-refundable evaluation fees.
- Hardware-level imaging: We connect your drives to write-blocked forensic stations and create bit-for-bit clones using PC-3000 and DeepSpar, keeping originals untouched and offline. This prevents the ransomware payload from executing or encrypting additional sectors during the recovery attempt.
- Decryption and file carving: We cross-reference the ransomware variant against known decryptor databases, including the No More Ransom Project and ID Ransomware. If a public decryption key exists for your strain, we apply it to the cloned image. If no decryptor is available, we carve the raw image for unencrypted file remnants, Volume Shadow Copies, and deleted backup fragments that the attacker missed.
You only pay when we return usable files. See our pricing for current recovery rates.
Data Recovery Standards & Verification
Our Austin lab operates on a transparency-first model. We use industry-standard recovery tools, including PC-3000 and DeepSpar, combined with strict environmental controls to make sure your hard drive is handled safely and properly. This approach allows us to serve clients nationwide with consistent technical standards.
Open-drive work is performed in a ULPA-filtered laminar-flow bench, validated to 0.02 µm particle count, verified using TSI P-Trak instrumentation.
Transparent History
Serving clients nationwide via mail-in service since 2008. Our lead engineer holds PC-3000 and HEX Akademia certifications for hard drive firmware repair and mechanical recovery.
Media Coverage
Our repair work has been covered by The Wall Street Journal and Business Insider, with CBC News reporting on our pricing transparency. Louis Rossmann has testified in Right to Repair hearings in multiple states and founded the Repair Preservation Group.
Aligned Incentives
Our "No Data, No Charge" policy means we assume the risk of the recovery attempt, not the client.
Technical Oversight
Louis Rossmann
Louis Rossmann's well trained staff review our lab protocols to ensure technical accuracy and honest service. Since 2008, his focus has been on clear technical communication and accurate diagnostics rather than sales-driven explanations.
We believe in proving standards rather than just stating them. We use TSI P-Trak instrumentation to verify that clean-air benchmarks are met before any drive is opened.
See our clean bench validation data and particle test videoFrequently Asked Questions About Ransomware Recovery
Can you recover my files without paying the ransom?
What are Volume Shadow Copies and can ransomware delete them?
My backup drive failed during the attack. Can that data be recovered?
How do you image an infected drive without spreading the ransomware?
Does your No Data No Fee policy apply to ransomware cases?
Why can deleted shadow copies be recovered from HDDs but not from modern SSDs?
How do you reconstruct a RAID array that ransomware damaged?
Will cyber insurance cover data recovery if my IT team attempts repairs without chain-of-custody documentation?
How much does enterprise ransomware data recovery cost?
How long does enterprise ransomware data recovery take?
Should our company pay the ransom to get data back faster?
How does hardware-level recovery impact our RTO and RPO?
How do I identify which ransomware family hit my network?
Related services
Related Recovery Services
Offline forensic imaging for LockBit-encrypted arrays
Recover failed backup drives
Synology, QNAP, Buffalo devices
Multi-drive array reconstruction
Recover wiped or deleted data
Evidence-grade imaging
Don't Pay The Ransom Yet
Let us check your hardware for other options first. Secure, confidential, and isolated.