Ransomware Data Recovery

How Does Ransomware Cause SSD Firmware Failures?

Sustained encryption write loads exhaust an SSD's spare block pool and trigger controller-level firmware panics. The drive locks into safe mode or drops off the bus entirely, requiring hardware intervention via PC-3000 SSD before any data extraction can begin.

Phison PS3111-S11 Safe-Mode Lock

Drives using the Phison PS3111 controller (common in Kingston A400, Patriot Burst, and Inland Professional SSDs) enter a read-only safe mode when the controller detects excessive NAND wear or write amplification. The drive reports its model string as "SATAfirm S11" instead of the original product name. A technician manually shorts the controller's ROM test pads to force it into factory ROM mode, then uses PC-3000 SSD to upload the loader (LDR) microcode and rebuild the flash translator in RAM to access the underlying NAND pages.

Silicon Motion SM2258XT Zero-Capacity Failure

SSDs with Silicon Motion SM2258XT controllers (used in Crucial BX500, ADATA SU650, and WD Green drives) report 0 bytes capacity after sustained high-IOPS write events. The controller loses its mapping table when the FTL journal overflows. PC-3000 SSD issues vendor-specific diagnostic commands to force the controller past the stalled boot sequence, then reconstructs the logical-to-physical address map using the native silicon for hardware descrambling. This recovers data that was never encrypted because the controller failed before the ransomware finished writing.

Both failure modes require physical board-level access before any decryption or file carving can proceed. Standard SSD data recovery techniques apply to these ransomware-triggered hardware failures.

How Does Ransomware Lock NVMe SSD Controllers?

High-IOPS random write workloads generated by ransomware encryption (LockBit, BlackCat/ALPHV) trigger Flash Translation Layer corruption in NVMe controllers. The drive enters a BSY state or drops off the PCIe bus, requiring physical board-level recovery before any file extraction.

Marvell 88SS1093 PCIe Timeout

NVMe drives using the Marvell 88SS1093 controller (found in early WD Black Gen 1 and Plextor M9Pe models) stall when the FTL metadata write-back queue overflows during sustained encryption. The drive stops responding to PCIe NVMe commands and the host logs "device not ready" errors. We use the PC-3000 Portable III PCIe NVMe adapter to access the controller's diagnostic mode and image the drive contents with managed read timeouts before the FTL corruption propagates to the user data area.

Samsung Elpis Controller Thermal Shutdown

Samsung 980 PRO drives use the Elpis controller, which enforces aggressive thermal throttling under sustained writes. Ransomware encryption loads push the controller past its thermal envelope, triggering an emergency shutdown that corrupts the FTL mapping tables. The drive may appear in BIOS but reports zero capacity. Because Samsung NVMe controllers use hardware-bound AES-256 encryption, data must be read through the original controller; NAND chip removal yields only ciphertext. If the controller temporarily stalls, we can cool the drive and extract data using managed read timeouts before complete FTL corruption occurs. If the FTL is fully corrupted, no commercial tool can currently reconstruct the Elpis mapping tables, and the data is permanently lost.

How Long Does Enterprise Ransomware Recovery Take?

Recovery timelines depend on the physical condition of the storage hardware & the number of drives in the array. The ransomware variant is irrelevant to imaging speed.

Single-Drive Cases: 1 to 5 Days

A single hard drive or SSD connected to a hardware write-blocker images at the media's native read speed. A healthy 2 TB HDD images in roughly 8 to 12 hours. Drives with bad sectors or firmware instability require PC-3000's managed read retry logic, which extends imaging to 2 to 5 days depending on damage density.

Multi-Drive RAID & SAN: 1 to 3 Weeks

Enterprise RAID arrays require each member disk to be imaged individually before virtual reconstruction begins. A 12-drive RAID 6 with 8 TB members means imaging 96 TB of raw capacity sequentially through write-blockers. After imaging, PC-3000 RAID Edition reconstructs the virtual array from the cloned images, parsing stripe sizes & parity rotation from the controller superblocks.

Rush Imaging Available

A +$100 rush fee to move to the front of the queue moves your drives to the front of the imaging queue. For multi-drive enterprise cases, contact us for a custom rush timeline based on your array size & hardware condition.

What Should Your IT Team Do in the First 60 Minutes After a Ransomware Attack?

Physically disconnect network cables from all affected machines, leave servers powered on to preserve volatile RAM evidence, and contact a recovery lab that uses hardware write-blockers for imaging. Incorrect triage in the first hour destroys forensic evidence and voids cyber insurance claims.

1. Disconnect network cables from all affected servers and workstations. Do not rely on disabling Wi-Fi or software-level network isolation. Pull the Ethernet cables and disable iSCSI initiators to prevent lateral movement across the domain. If the attack entered through RDP or a compromised VPN appliance, disable those access points at the firewall.
2. Do not power down affected machines. Active encryption keys and threat actor artifacts reside in volatile RAM. A hard shutdown erases this forensic evidence permanently. If you need to stop encryption from progressing, disconnect the storage (pull SAS/SATA cables) rather than cutting power to the entire server.
3. Contact a lab that uses hardware write-blockers for imaging. Software-based forensic copies risk executing the ransomware payload on the imaging workstation. We connect affected drives to hardware write-blockers and create sector-level clones using PC-3000 without ever mounting the file system. For multi-drive server and RAID environments, each member disk is imaged individually before any reconstruction begins.

What Happens After the First 60 Minutes of a Ransomware Attack?

The triage steps above stop the bleeding. The full recovery lifecycle has six phases, each with specific hardware & documentation requirements that affect your cyber insurance claim eligibility.

1. Validate the attack. Confirm you're dealing with actual encryption, not adware or a lock-screen scam. Check for ransom notes in affected directories & cross-reference the file extensions against ID Ransomware to identify the variant. If a public decryptor exists, the recovery process changes.
2. Assemble the response team. Your IR team includes IT staff, legal counsel, your cyber insurance carrier's breach hotline, & the data recovery lab. Insurance carriers often require notification within 24 to 72 hours of discovery. Delayed notification voids coverage on some policies.
3. Contain via hardware isolation. This is the first-60-minutes triage: pull network cables, leave machines powered on, disable RDP & VPN endpoints at the firewall. Every server & workstation that touched the infected network segment gets isolated.
4. Image all affected drives using hardware write-blockers. We connect each drive to a write-blocker & create bit-for-bit forensic clones using PC-3000 & DeepSpar. The write-blocker prevents the ransomware payload from executing during imaging. Original drives stay offline & untouched from this point forward.
5. Extract recoverable data from forensic images. We scan cloned images for deleted files, Volume Shadow Copies, unencrypted free-space fragments, & backup archives the attacker missed. On mechanical drives, deleted VSS data persists on the magnetic platters until overwritten. On SSDs, TRIM limits what can be recovered.
6. Deliver forensic documentation for insurance & law enforcement. We generate SHA-256 hashes, timestamped recovery logs, ransomware variant identification, & an independent audit report. Your insurer receives the full chain-of-custody documentation proving evidence integrity from seizure through recovery.

Chain-of-Custody Documentation for Cyber Insurance Claims

Cyber liability policies require forensic documentation proving evidence integrity. Attempting internal recovery without establishing a forensic baseline gives adjusters grounds to deny business interruption and ransom reimbursement claims.

Pre-Imaging SHA-256 Hashing

Before we connect any write-blocker, we generate SHA-256 cryptographic hashes of every affected drive at the raw block device level. These hashes establish a verifiable baseline proving no data was altered between seizure and imaging. The hash values, timestamps, and drive serial numbers go into the forensic log.

Forensic Audit Trail

Every recovery action is timestamped and logged: which engineer handled the drive, what tools were used, which sectors were read, and what files were extracted. This chronological documentation satisfies the chain-of-custody requirements that insurance adjusters and legal counsel review before approving payouts.

Independent Reporting

We deliver a forensic incident report alongside the recovered data. The report includes hash verification results, a timeline of all recovery procedures, and the ransomware variant identification. Your IT team can submit this directly to your insurer or attach it to a law enforcement filing. Read more about our physical and digital security protocols.

How Do You Recover Data from Ransomware-Encrypted Virtual Machines?

Ransomware targeting VMware ESXi or Hyper-V environments encrypts the virtual disk files (VMDK, VHD, VHDX) rather than individual guest files. Recovery requires bypassing the host layer.

VMDK/VHDX Sector-Level Mounting

We image the affected datastore LUNs offline using hardware write-blockers. PC-3000 Data Extractor mounts the virtual disk images at the sector level, bypassing the hypervisor and reading the guest file system directly from the flat file. If the ransomware only encrypted the VMDK descriptor or the first few extents, the remaining guest data is readable.

Incomplete Encryption Carving

Most ransomware encrypts in chunks; if the process was interrupted (power loss, detection, reboot), large portions of the virtual disk remain unencrypted. We parse the flat file extent by extent in a hex editor, identify the encrypted vs. unencrypted blocks, and carve recoverable files from the clean regions.

Backup Repository Repair

Attackers commonly target Veeam repositories and NAS-based backup shares before encrypting production VMs. We perform standard NAS recovery on these backup devices. Recovering a pre-attack Veeam backup set restores the entire VM state from before the encryption event.

How Do You Extract VMFS Data After ESXi Ransomware?

Ransomware variants like Akira and LockBit target VMware ESXi hypervisors through SSH tunneling or Active Directory integration exploits. We disconnect the storage from the compromised host and extract data directly from the underlying hardware.

Offline VMFS Datastore Parsing

ESXi ransomware encrypts .vmdk flat files and .vmx configuration files on the VMFS datastore. We disconnect the SAN or DAS storage from the compromised ESXi host, connect each drive to a hardware write-blocker, and reconstruct the underlying RAID array using PC-3000 RAID Edition. Data Extractor then parses the raw VMFS file system directly, without the hypervisor layer. If the ransomware only encrypted the VMDK descriptor or the first few extents, the remaining guest OS data is readable from the unencrypted flat file regions.

Targeting Backup Repository Drives

Attackers commonly delete or encrypt Veeam backup repositories and NAS-based backup shares before encrypting production VMs. When the backup storage uses a separate physical array, we perform standard server data recovery on those backup drives. Recovering a pre-attack Veeam VBK backup set restores the entire VM state from before the encryption event without needing to decrypt anything.

How Do You Recover SQL Server Databases Wiped by Ransomware?

Attackers brute-force exposed MSSQL ports and use the xp_cmdshell stored procedure to delete .mdf and .ldf database files without dropping traditional encryption binaries. Recovery requires raw sector carving from the underlying storage.

xp_cmdshell Database Deletion

Campaigns like DB#JAMMER gain access through weak SA passwords on internet-facing SQL Server instances, enable xp_cmdshell, and issue OS-level delete commands against the .mdf (data) and .ldf (transaction log) files. Because no encryption binary runs on the host, endpoint detection tools miss the attack entirely. The database files are simply deleted at the file system level.

Raw MDF Page Carving from Offline Images

We image the underlying host drives offline using hardware write-blockers and scan the raw sectors for deleted SQL data pages and transaction log fragments. On mechanical drives, the deleted .mdf pages persist on the magnetic platters until physically overwritten. We reassemble the recovered 8 KB SQL data pages into a consistent database structure. If the server used encrypted storage, the raw sector scan operates on the decrypted block device layer after we unlock the volume with the customer's BitLocker or LUKS key.

No Fix, No Fee for Ransomware Cases